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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
(;J,;H"\LI> .J. l'HKASOX and \'IOLA M.
CHEAt-\<lX, and
CO:N"STHFCTOHI:::;, J:\C., a eorporation,
Plai 11 t i_tj's-lles pmzdc 11 t ",
v.

Case No.
11878

.\HX'I' Ll';HUY PETI<:HS()X and RLTBY
\\'.
his ''"ife,

Dcfc11d ants-A ppellauts.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to recover damages for breach of
the c.:oyeuants of a Utah statutory form of warranty
deed.

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
Plaintiff's-Respondents received a judgment in the
sum of
plus interest.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmation of the judgment of
the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 20th day of December, 1963, Appellants
gave Respondents a Warranty Deed (Plfs ex. 2 and
R-5), conveying certain property in Salt Lake County.
The starting point of the description was the intersection of the center lines of 9th East and 56th South
Streets which point was also related to a corner of a
quarter quarter section. The description did not ref er
to a fence line. At the trial two ( 2) survey plats
(Plfs ex 3 and 4) of the property prepared by Surveyor Charles V. King were received in evidence upon
the stipulation of Appellants that if King was called
he would testify that he had prepared them (R-73
line 38 and R-74 line 12). Robert B. Jones testified
for Respondents that his field crew, including at least
one licensed surveyor acting under his direction field
checked the first plat prepared by Surveyor King
( R-7 5 line 22) and discovered an error which he believed was a chaining error ( R-82 line 18) ; that he
pointed that error out to King (R-76 line 2), who then
sent his field crew out to check to discrepancy. The
second survey plat was then prepared by King to correct that discrepancy. Jones testified that the corrected
suney was accurate (R-76 line 15). He testified that
his crew's field notes began at a monument at the center
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of 5tith South aBd 9th East designatiBg the center
of that intersection (R-78 line 19 and R-77 line Hi);
that ),,, kuew of that monument and had personally
.iscd it at least twice in the previous year (R-80 line
J ) . Ile further testified that it was customary ill the
profession for a surveyor to rely on the field
notes aBd fiBdings of his field crew ( R-88 line 25) .
AppellaBts called two surveyor witnesses, each of
whom testified that the second King surYey was done
rnrrectly ( R-Ia4 line 2 & R-135 liBe 3, in accordance
with good surveying practice and as they would have
doue the survey if they had done it themselves ( R- Hli
l iue
. Each of the surveyors testified that that
<:orner of the quarter quarter section was a paper tie
(ll-81 line 26, R-128 line 15 and R-143 line 9);
that there was no marker or monument designating
that point; and that it was proper to rely on the monumcBt at the intersection of 56th South and 9th East
as King had done (R-78 line 19), R-134 line 9, and
R- H6 line 7) . Appellants' witness, Goff, testified that
accordnig to the "Old Bible" kept in the County Surn·yor's Office the original survey of that intersection
'ms accomplished in 1896 and that road stones were
located at all four corners of the intersection at that
time ( ll-127 line 11) .
The survey plat which all of the experts agreed was
properly prepared shows the Northerly line of the
dcseribed property to be 4.5 to 4.1 feet North of and
outside of a fence that is upon the ground (Plfs ex :3).
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Mr. Erekson testified that his family owned and were
in possession of the property North of that fence since
1920 (R-120 line 28 & R-122 line 5).
Don A. Stringham testified at length about his
efforts expended to obtain surveys, examine title, prepare and obtain quit-claim deeds both between Respondents and other owners and between Respondents
and their purchasers, to conform the property delivered
to that described and to satisfy Respondents purchasers
of the identically described property respecting the
land that Respondents had sold but failed to deliver
(R-91line1 and R-116 line 6).
ARGUMENT
Point I
THE EVIDENCE THAT THE PROPERTY
DESCRIBED DID NOT COINCIDE 'VI'fH
THE PROPERTY FENCED IS COMPETENT
AND UNCONTRADICTED.
Appellants assert without citation of precedent or
authority that Robert Jones testimony that the second
King Survey was accurate based upon the investigation, verification, and field notes of his field crew,
which included a licensed surveyor was incompetent, apparently because he did not personally hold the tape or
sight the transit to make the required measurements.
I assume that if he had held the tape or sighted the
instrument Appellants would claim the testimony of
4

the person holding the other end of the tape was also
required. The cases hold otherwise. 32 C.J.S. .J.Hl
·1!1lle1 the heading Evidence, subsection 5J(j ( 112),
e1 it it led "'Surveying" states the rule as follows:
"A surveyor may interpret the field notes of
another, where a proper foundation is laid ... "
ln the case of Warczynski v. Bamycz, 117 A 2<l
573, cited in support of the statement in C.J.S., the
Supreme Court of :\Iaryland held that an employee
iu a suneyor's office could testify concerning a plat
prepared by his employer's off ice and the field notes
of the survey on which the plat was based, even though
he had not made the plat or participated in the survey
(the employer was ill), on the basis that such survey
and notes were made and kept in the regular course
of business.
POINT II
THEHE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
,\PP ELLAN T'S THEORY THAT THE PROPER COl\I:\IENCEMENT POINT 'VAS IN LIN)<_:
\\'lTH THE NORTH FENCE.
Appellants introduced the testimony of two expert
witnesses at the trial-both they and Robert Jones
re.i cctc<l the invitation of Appellants' counsel to agree
that the fence was the proper starting point (R-81 line
.). R-8!J line 27, R-131line12, and R-HJ line 16). All
that the Kini.r Survey
was correctlv• made.
three a<rrecd
b
•
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Appellants apparently contend that Judge Elton
should have rejected their expert testimony and should
himself have determined that the starting point was
in line with the fence based solely on the recitation in
several old deeds (the last was in 1943), not including
the deed in question, that such point was in line with
a fence (Defs ex 7 Abstract Page 26 and earlier
pages). Even if one concludes that the fence which
had been re-built several times over the years (R-123
line 16) had not been moved, there is no indication
approaching the quality of admissible evidence that it
was originally in line with such starting point. That
the starting point in those descriptions is not only
double but triple tied (the fence, the intersection, and
the quarter quarter corner) suggests some insecurity
on the part of the grantor. It is a matter of common
knowledge, about which the Court can take judicial
notice, that the location of fence lines is often approximated and that succeeding grantors merely copy the
description used by their grantor. If it was not common
knowledge, each of the expert witnesses so testified
in this case (R-81 line 5, R-131 line 5, and R-144 lines
13-21). The source of the dispute in this case is the
failure of Appellants to continue the practice of referring to the fence in their description. If they had done
so Respondent would presumably have continued the
practice and we would all have been spared this comparatively small but tedious dispute.
Appellants have in this case relied on the Reese
v. ft-lurdocl.· Case, 121 Ut. 517, 243 P2d 948, wherein
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the Court concluded that where the monwnent for the
same 11uarter quarter section mentioned in the instant
description (and described by each of the surveyor
witnesses as a paper tie) was missing or never present
and where its location was uncertain even by calculation,
a fence, regarded prior to the survey by everyone
involved to he on the section line was a more reliable
monument than the old survey notes which supported
the calculations on which surveys conflicting with that
fence were based. The Court indicated its uncertainty
about its decision as follows:
"There seems to be no possibility that anyone
will ever dispute the right of plaintiffs to the
property to that fence line, and should such dispute arise he may rely on his warranty deed
and look to the Whites to make it good. 'Vhere
this quarter quarter corner was under the original
and as re-established cannot he demonstrated and under the evidence is very uncertain,
hut the situation demands that it he made certain
by this decision, as between these parties. The
existence of this fence line under these facts and
circumstances is sufficient to sustain the finding
of the trial court's decision."
The instant case is very different. The monument
marking the intersection of 56th South and 9th East
to which the description is tied was in place and used
by the surveyors. Despite Appellants' effort at trial
to render its location uncertain, all of the expert witnesses testified that the intersection had been clearly
marked since 1896, except for brief periods where the
markers or monuments were destroyed or removed
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aud had to Lie replaced (R-77 line lti, ll-1:27,
line 11, awl R-141 line 1).
Presumauly, there was some competent evi<le11et
to support the determination in the Rce1Se t'. 1llurducl"
case that the fence was in fact on the section li11c. In
the instant case that determination would have to depend upou recitations in deeds which were in all
probability simply based on similar recitations iu prior
deeds. 'V c have no indication of the basis of the original
in the instant case the trial court
recitation.
determined on competent evidence that the description
aml the fence line did not coincide. Even if there was
competent evidence to the contrary and Respondents
claim there was not, Judge Elton's determination made
as it was on the oasis of his observation of the witnesses
and their testimony, shoudl be upheld.
POINT Ill
APPELLANTS' CO YEN ANTS OF
IET
AND YVARRANTY "rERE
BROKEN BY THE CONSTRUCTIYE EYICTION OF RESPONDENTS AND TIIEIH
GHAXTEES FROM 'l'HE LAND CON,'EYED
TO
LYING NORTH OF THE FENCE.
Erekson clearlv
. testified that he and his familr.
had owned and been in possession of the laud lyiug
North of the fence since 1920 ( R-120 line 19 and following). It is likely that his chain of title derires
from conveyances us mg the fence as a starting poiut
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in which case he is probably the owner by grant of
the strip cf land North of the fence. If not he was
iu t)pen notorious possession for some forty nine years
«ll<l had acquired it by adverse possession. Short of
that all of the recent decisions of this Court indicate
to this writer that he would be declared to be the owner
under the doctrine of "Boundary by Acquiescence".
See particularly King v. Frong, 14 Ut 2d 135, 378
P 2d 893. Also see Fuoco v. Williams, 18 Ut. 2d, 282,
4:21 P2d 944. Respondents cannot even claim that their
grantors grantors or the grantors grantor before him
had title to that strip by grant or otherwise because
the descriptions in their respective conveyances began
from the fence line. Appellants dilemma is simply
that they received a conveyance of one piece of property and conveyed to Respondents a slightly different
one relying on some previous grantor's prediction that
the point of beginning was at the fence line without
protecting themselves by tying their point of beginning
to the fence line.
In any event the cases do not require Respondents
to become a trespasser and be evicted or to bring a
useless and losing action to quiet title in order to obtain
damages for their grantor's breach of the covenants of
warranty and quiet possession. The rule is noted at 20
Am .Tur 2d, 630, Covenants, as follows:
"§ 61. Inability of grantee to obtain possession
from adverse claimant.

As a general rule, where at the time of the
conYeyance the premises are in the possession
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of a third person claiming uu<ler a paramount
title, so that the covenantee is unable to obtain
possession of the property, a constructive eviction
exists which supports an immediate action for
breach of the covenant of warranty. The reaso11
most frequently given for this rule is that the
law will not compel the grantee to commit a
trespass in order to establish a lawful right in
another action. lVhere the covenantor has no
title, possession of the premises by a third person
under color of title has been held sufficient to
amouu t to a constructive eviction breaking the
covenant."
The entire subject is discussed in an annotation
entitled ""That Amounts to a Constructive Eviction,
\Yhich \Vill Support Action for Breach of Covenant
of \V arranty or for Quiet Enjoyment" at 172 A..L.R.
18. under subparagraph VIII entitled "Inability of
Grantee to Obtain Possession", subparagraph E-J
entitled "Adverse Possession By One Under Color of
Title'', the rule is stated.
"\Yhere the covenantor has no title, possession
of a third person under color by title has been
held sufficient to amount to a constructive eviction."
No contrary decisions were noted.
Judge Elton was and is perfectly capable of determining whether Respondents were reasonable in not
trespassing, in not bringing a losing quiet title action
and in fact in proceeding as they did to remedy the
situation and satisfy their grantees.
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POINT IV
HESPONDENTS ACTIONS TO REMEDY
THE DEFECTIVE TITLE AND TO SATISFY
THEIR GRANTEES WERE INCURRED AS
A RESULT OF APPELLANTS' BREACH;
\VERE REASONABLE; WERE LEGALLY
CO)iPENSABLE; AND THE AMOUNT
:\\VARDED BY THE COURT AS COMPENSATION WAS NOT EXCESSIVE.
Some of the expense and activity of Respondents·
attorney to remedy the breach was addressed to clarifying title to the fence lines on the East and South sides
of the property. Appellants' claim that activity and expense should not be compensated because they point out,
it was to obtain title to land outside the land conveyed,
which is true. The point is, it was in an effort to satisfy
Respondents' grantees and not to obtain additional
land for Respondents themselves that such activity
was undertaken. Respondents eventually satisfied their
grantees and protected their sale by clarifying title
to thal property and crediting them $200.00 on the
agreed purchase price because they could not obtain
title to the apparently desirable North strip. Obviously,
clarifying title to the South and East strips was a part of
the consideration given to Respondents' grantees without which the price concession on the North strip would
not have been available, whereupon said grantees could
hiffe rescinded their purchase and Respondents' damages would have been greater. Whether Respondents'
11

activities on the South and East strips are <lescribe<l
in terms of mitigation of damages or expense reasoua bly incurred to correct Appellants' breach, the result
is the same.
It is helpful to look at this problem through Respondents' eyes. They bought a tract of property and
sold that tract by a deed using an identical description.
\\'hen their grantees discovered the title line and fence
discrepancy they asked Respondents to correct it.
Respondents hired Don A. Stringham, a qualified
attorney, who I submit proceeded reasonably to obtain
surveys, title reports, quit claim deeds, satisfaction
of judgments, agreements and an adjustment of
price with Respondents grantees respecting the property he could not obtain because the owner would not
sell it. In this process Respondents incurred and paid
$750.00 in attorney's fees and $499.00 in expenses.
The Court apparently in a gesture of compromise
because of the hot dispute gave Respondents judgment
for only $720.00. Respondents have only the benefit
of a bargain he was entitled to, less $1,249.00 in actual
expense, less also the expense of a trial and this appeal.
Appellants who caused the difficulty by selling property they didn't own now claim that imposing $720.00
of that expense on them is excessive and unreasonable.
Appellants have in their brief attempted to limit
Respondents' damages to only certain of his expenses,
but clearly all of said expenses were incurred by Respondents to correct a problem they caused.
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Courts generally and Utah in particular have
allowed Plaintiffs in actions for breach of covenants of
wiuranty and quiet enjoyment all of their costs includjqg reasonable attorney's fees actually incurred to
maintain or def end title to the premises conveyed. See
VanCott v. Jacklin, 63 Ut. 412, 226 Pac. 460 at Page
.J;o3 for the Utah rule. For the rule generally see the
annotation entitled "Damages for Breach of Covenants
of Title" at 61 ALR 10, particularly subsection XIV
beginning at Page 154.
CONCLUSION
Appellants' theory of the case is not supported by
the evidence. If it was, the trial court found against
them on the basis of competent evidence. Respondents
proceeded reasonably to satisfy the claims of their
grantees. The expenses they incurred were directly
caused by Appellants' breach of their covenants and
warranty and quiet enjoyment. Even though the trial
court did not give them judgment for all of the expenses
they incurred as a result of that breach, Respondents
now ask that the judgment of the trial court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Gerald E. Nielson
840 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorney for PlaintiffsRespondents
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